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THE STATUS OF REPAYMENT PROVISIONS
IN CURRENT WELFARE LAW
Welfare regulations for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania require
applicants who own certain types of real or personal property to
agree, as a condition for receiving assistance under the Aid to Fam-
ilies with Depedendent Children (AFDC) program, to reimburse the
Commonwealth for benefits received., A lien is taken on the property
as security for the repayment promise.2 Two class actions, Charleston
v. lVohlgemuth 3 and Coleman v. IVohlgemuth,4 were brought seeking
invalidation of those regulations on the grounds that they conflicted
with the Federal Social Security Act5 and violated the fourteenth
amendment's equal protection and due process clauses.6 The suits
were consolidated and tried before a three-judge court7 which found
both the statutory and constitutional arguments to be without merit.8
This comment will demonstrate that this holding is inconsistent with
the recent trend of judicial decisions in the welfare area.9
I. The welfare statutes of 34 states provide for repayments to the welfare fund
by recipients. Snell v. Wyman, 281 F. Supp. 853, 861 n.13 (S.D.N.Y. 1968),
citing U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, PUBLIC ASSISTANCE REP.
No. 50, CHARACTERISTICS OF STATE PUBLIC ASSISTANCE PLANS UNDER THE
SOCIAL SECURITY ACT (1964). Since 1964, two of the 34 states have repealed
their repayment laws. 281 F. Supp. at 861 n.13.
2. DEPART.MENT OF WELFARE PUB. ASSISTANCE MANUAL §§ 3822, 3822.1,
3822.2, 3822.21 (1971). Note, however, that the statutory origin is PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 62, §§ 401 et seq. (Purdon 1968). This statute is general and delegates
to the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare the formulation of standards as
to eligibility for assistance, and the nature and extent thereof. Id. § 403. Thus,
the Pennsylvania state plan consists principally of the regulations contained in the
Pennsylvania Manual.
3. 332 F. Supp. 1175 (E.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd per curiam, 405 U.S. 970 (1972).
4. 332 F. Supp. 1175 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601 et seq. (1969).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
7. Actually, two three-judge courts were convened, consisting of the same three
judges.
8. 332 F. Supp. at 1177.
9. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618 (1969); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968), aff'g 277 F. Supp. 31
(M.D. Ala. 1967); Stoddard v. Fisher, 330 F. Supp. 566 (D. Me. 1971); Cooper
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I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Charleston is the mother of six minor children. Her $118
semi-monthly earnings are supplemented by $151 semi-monthly
AFDC assistance. Upon purchase of a home pursuant to the Federal
Housing Authority's section 23510 plan, she was asked to sign Penn-
sylvania Department of Public Welfare (DPW) form DPA 9 which
would give DPW a lien on her property. She refused.
The income received by plaintiff Coleman and her seven minor
children consisted of a $10 bi-weekly support order payment and a
$218.30 semi-monthly AFDC benefit. After being injured in an auto-
mobile accident, she refused to sign form DPA 176-K which would
assign her personal injury claim to DPW.
These two plaintiffs are typical of the persons bringing this class
action. All plaintiffs had either executed DPA 9 or DPA 176-K forms
or had refused to and, in the latter case, risked forfeiture of AFDC
aid.31
The DPA 9 and DPA 176-K forms are basically similar. Each sets
forth a portion of the DPW regulations. In executing a DPA 9 form,
the applicant acknowledges liability for the repayment of any benefits
received by himself, his spouse or unemancipated children. In accord-
ance with the provisions recited on the form, this promise is to be
secured by giving DPW a lien on real or personal property owned
while assistance was received. This lien may be executed at any time
after commencement of benefits, but shall not, under DPW regula-
tions, be so executed during the lifetime of the signer, his spouse or
dependent children. The DPA 176-K form is directed to certain types
of personal property: alimony payments, delayed wages, estates of
deceased recipients, income tax refunds, life insurance sick benefits
and support order payments, among others. It contains an assign-
ment which is served upon the recipient's attorney or the agency
paying the benefits, directing payment of the proceeds of the claim
or benefits to DPW.
Both forms include an authorization for the prothonotary, court
clerk or any attorney to appear in any court, at any time, to confess
v. Laupheimer, 316 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. Pa. 1970). See also the more recent case,
Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598 (1972), aff'g 325 F. Supp. 1272 (N.D. Cal.
1971).
10. 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-2 (1970).
11. The plaintiffs' right to receive assistance pending the outcome was secured
by a temporary restraining order. 332 F. Supp. at 1178.
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judgment against the signer for $2,000.12 Judgment is entered with-
out notice to the welfare recipient and without a hearing. The
judgment entered as a result of a confession clause has the same
force and effect as any other judgment, i.e., it acts as a lien upon the
debtor's presently owned property and on after-acquired property if
the judgment is revived on real property or executed upon personal
property.13 DPW regulations provide for departmental hearings, at
the applicant's request, to settle any dispute which may arise regard-
ing the amount of the assistance claim or virtually any other matter
affecting his relations with DPW.1 4
II. THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE ARGUIENT
Plaintiffs' allegations that the Pennsylvania repayment provisions
conflicted with the Federal Social Security Act by imposing a con-
dition of eligibility beyond that of need and dependency were effec-
tively met with the reasoning that: "Snell v. Wyman 5 . . . is the con-
trolling precedent in this case."' 6 "If Snell is incorrect . . . there is
plainly nothing that this Court can do about it, since, by virtue of
affirmance, Snell now represents the teaching of the Supreme Court."17
Snell upheld the constitutional and statutory validity of reimburse-
ment and lien provisions under a New York State plan 8 basically
similar to Pennsylvania's AFDC program. Probably the only sig-
nificant difference between the two state plans is that under the New
York laws and regulations challenged in Snell, the lien which origi-
nates is a statutory one-it arises automatically from the granting of
assistance-while the lien is obtained by a confession of judgment
under the Pennsylvania provisions.
The stark similarity in the fact patterns of Snell and Charleston
would make the instant court's reasoning persuasive were it not for
12. P. SHUOHIIAN, HANDBOOK ON THE USE OF JUDGMIENT NOTES IN PENN-
SYLVANIA § 1.1 (1961).
13. 332 F. Supp. at 1180.
14. Accumulation of liens is permitted where the aid received exceeds that
amount. Where the assistance received is less than $2,000, DPW may recover only
the lesser amount regardless of the amount of the lien. 332 F. Supp. at 1179.
15. 281 F. Supp. 853 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd per curiam, 393 U.S. 323 (1969).
16. 332 F. Supp. at 1181.
17. Id. at 1182. See CENTER ON SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY AND LAw, MATE-
RIALS ON WELFARE LAW, at VII-1 to -28 (1972).
18. N.Y. Soc. WELFARE LAW § 104 (McKinney 1966).
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the interposition of the Supreme Court's ruling in King v. Smith,10
and district court rulings in Cooper v. Laupheimero and Stoddard v.
Fisher.21 These cases, like Snell and Charleston, involved the Aid to
Families with Dependent Children program as set up by the Social
Security Act of 1935.
The Social Security Act established a trilogy of categorical public
assistance programs. 22 One member of this tripartite structure is the
AFDC program, which singles out the "dependent child" as a re-
cipient of welfare benefits. A dependent child is defined by the federal
statute as an age-qualified, "needy child ... who has been deprived
of parental support or care by reason of the death, continued absence
from the home, or physical or mental incapacity of a parent, and who
is living with . ."3 any of several listed relatives. A further statutory
requirement provides "that aid to families with dependent children
shall be furnished with reasonable promptness to all eligible individ-
uals."24
The federal statute's silence on the question of the states' ability
to impose eligibility requirements in addition to need and depend-
ency renders the statute ambiguous. 25 This ambiguity was resolved
by the teaching of the court in King, as expressed in Stoddard:
absent specific indications of Congressional authorizations for the
states to exclude a class of dependent children by narrowing a
specific federally-imposed eligibility factor, any state eligibility
standards which exclude persons eligible for assistance under the
federal standards are in conflict with Congressional intent and
void under the federal statute.26
19. 392 U.S. 309 (1968). It is of interest to note that Snell v. Wyman was
decided in the district court prior to the Supreme Court's decision in King v.
Smith. Snell was later affirmed without opinion by the Supreme Court.
20. 316 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
21. 330 F. Supp. 566 (D. Me. 1971). See also Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S.
598 (1972), decided after the Charleston decision was handed down.
22. See generally Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 256 (1970).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1969).
24. Id. § 602(a)(10) (1969).
25. See generally Comment, AFDC Eligibility Requirements Unrelated to Need:
The Impact of King v. Smith, 118 U. PA. L. Rnv. 1219 (1970).
26. 330 F. Supp. at 571. See also Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598 (1972);
Doe v. Hirsh, 328 F. Supp. 1360 (D. Minn. 1970); Woods v. Miller, 318 F. Supp.
510 (W.D. Pa. 1970); Cooper v. Laupheimer, 316 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. Pa. 1970);
Doe v. Shapiro, 302 F. Supp. 761 (D. Conn. 1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S.
488 (1970); AFDC Eligibility Requirements Unrelated to Need: The Impact of
King v. Smith, supra note 25, at 1239.
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Legislative history,27 however, dearly indicates the states' freedom
in setting their own standards of need for AFDC purposes. 28 Penn-
sylvania's definition of need29 does not bar the owner of real or per-
sonal property from being a recipient of welfare assistance, provided
the property owned is not disparate to circumstances of a person
receiving AFDC aid and the property is not immediately convertible
to cash 3O to meet current living expenses.
Yet, DPW regulations make the grant of assistance to such owner
conditional upon the execution of either form DPA 9 or DPA 176-K, 31
the effect of which is to create a lien on the property. In so doing,
DPW is ignoring its own prior determination of need:
(1) that despite the ownership of realty or personalty, the family
is eligible for assistance because the property affords them no access
to cash for their daily living expenses;
(2) that despite the property the family is in a situation not dis-
similar to other families receiving AFDC assistance; and, therefore,
(3) that despite the property the family is eligible for aid.
Thus, meeting DPW's standard of need is not, in itself, sufficient to
obtain AFDC benefits. Such benefits will be granted only if the ap-
plicant signs the lien or assignment form. Taken in this perspective,
the state provision is seen as a state-imposed eligibility requirement
and inconsistent with the Social Security Act as interpreted in King.
Unfortunately, because of the Charleston court's failure to give
cognizance to prevailing congressional and judicial views regard-
ing welfare as a right to which all persons meeting the requirements
of need and dependency are entitled,2 that result was not reached.
Through blind application of the Snell doctrine, the court, despite
27. 392 U.S. at 318 n.14.
28. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 408 (1970); King v. Smith, 392 U.S.
309, 318 (1968). See also note 25 supra, at 1241.
29. DEPARTMENT OF WELFARE PUB. ASSISTANCE MANUAL § 3826 (1971).
30. Id. These regulations are in conformity with HEW regulations which
require that only income and resources actually available for current use on a
regular basis be considered in determining need. HANDBOOK OF PUB. ASSISTANCE
ADMIN. PART IV, ELIoIILITY ASSISTANCE SERVICES § 3120--AvAILABLniTY OF
l'COME AND RESOURCES (1971).
31. DEPARTMIENT OF WELFARE PUB. ASSISTANCE MANUAL § 3826 (1971).
32. Stoddard v. Fisher, 330 F. Supp. 566, 569 (D.N.C. 1971); Cooper v.
Laupheimer, 316 F. Supp. 264, 269 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
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judicial sympathy,33 missed the opportunity to eliminate "the adverse
effect of the lien on the mobility, self-sufficiency, and even the living
standards of welfare recipients."3 4
III. Tim EQUAL PROTECTION ARGUMENT
The impact of Snell-with Dandridge v. Williams"s as a conduit-
extended likewise to strike down plaintiffs' equal protection claim.
They claimed essentially that the DPW regulations created two classes
of needy and dependent children, otherwise eligible for assistance:
those who receive AFDC assistance because their parents have exe-
cuted a DPA 9 or DPA 176-K form and those who are denied
assistance because of their parents' refusal to sign, and that this con-
stitutes a violation of the equal protection clause.30 This argument
was rejected by the court based on the following reasoning:
(1) The equal protection questions discussed in Snell differ from
those in the instant case.37
(2) The leading equal protection case in the welfare field is
Dandridge v. Williams.38
(8) Dandridge v. Williams cited Snell.
(4) Snell is the authority for applying the equal protection
standards.
Dandridge did indeed adopt Snell as the authority for applying
equal protection standards in the welfare context:
33. 332 F. Supp. at 1180.
34. Id.
35. 397 U.S. 471 (1970), rev'g 297 F. Supp. 450 (D. Md. 1968).
36. Cf. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971), a case involving the action of
a parent in refusing to accede to a home visit as a condition of eligibility for
AFDC benefits. Analogous to the principal case, the parental refusal worked a
deprivation on the children involved. Under those facts, it could have been
argued that a separate class of needy and dependent children had been created
and was being discriminated against in violation of the equal protection clause.
The Court, while basing its decision on fourth amendment guarantees, implicitly
refuted such an argument by its broad statement: "The choice is entirely hers,
and nothing of Constitutional magnitude is involved." Id. at 324.
37. The lien obtained in Snell was a statutory one arising automatically from
the granting of assistance. Here, the lien is given by vehicle of a confession of
judgment.
38. Dandridge involved an action to enjoin the use of maximum grant regula-
tions as an invidious discrimination against large families and, therefore, violative
of equal protection. The Court found that the regulations were rationally sup-
ported and justified by legitimate state interests.
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In the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not
violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifica-
tions made by its laws are imperfect. If the classification has some
"reasonable basis," it does not offend the Constitution simply
because the classification "is not made with mathematical nicety
or because in practice it results in some inequality." 39
Thus, under the precedent of Snell, a state classification is to be re-
viewed under the "traditional test"" rather than under the "com-
pelling state interest test"4 1 laid down in Shapiro v. Thompson.42
Where the latter test requires the court to analyze, inter alia, the
character of the classification, the state purpose being promoted and
the validity of the state interest being asserted, the former test re-
quires only that the state classification have a reasonable basis43 and
that it not be invidiously discriminatory.4 That is, regardless of the
arbitrariness of a classification, it must be sustained if any state goal
can be imagined that is furthered by its efforts.45
The state interests to be promoted by the classification in the
instant case are: financing the assistance program, saving of tax
money and encouraging self-sufficiency, protection and collection of
DPW claims for reimbursement mandated by Pennsylvania's Support
Law,4 1, and equal treatment of all property owners. Any one, or com-
bination of, those state interests would be sufficient to supply the
reasonable basis needed to support the eligibility requirements.47
Having so determined, the court in Charleston was not free to do
other than uphold the validity of the repayment provisions on equal
protection grounds. It could decide contrarily only if it chose to
challenge Dandridge as an unique and isolated case rather than re-
gard it as a halt in the trend toward full protection of the poor
through equal protection of the laws.48
39. 397 U.S. at 485.
40. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911).
41. 394 U.S. 618 (1969). See generally Comment, Constitutional Law--The
North Carolina Public Assistance Lien Law and Current Constitutional Doctrine,
49 N.CL. REV. 519, 522 (1971).
42. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
43. 397 U.S. at 487.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 508 (dissenting opinion).
46. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, §§ 401 et seq. (Purdon 1968).
47. See Comment, Snell v. Wyman and the Constitutional Issues Posed by
Welfare Repayment Provisions, 55 VA. L. Rzv. 177, 188 (1969).
48. Note, Shapiro, Dandridge, and Residence Requirements in Public Housing,
1971 URBAN L. ANN. 131, 133.
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IV. THm DuE PRocEss ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs' third argument invoked application of the fourteenth
amendment due process clause. That argument was twofold: (1)
that by being required to execute the DPA 9 or DPA 176-K form, the
welfare recipient is forced to relinquish his constitutional rights of
notice and hearing, and (2) that, in order to avoid being deprived
of property pursuant to the judgment lien, he is required to institute
onerous litigations in the nature of proceedings to open judgment.4
The court, having found Snell to be dispositive of the statutory
and equal protection arguments, seemed determined to resolve the
due process question in a like manner. It subsequently did so by
focusing on the second aspect of plaintiffs' argument-that involving
the burden of opening the judgment-and virtually ignoring the
contention that their constitutional rights of hearing and notice were
violated. This approach is evidenced by the court's application of
Swarb v. Lennox:50 "The most striking feature.., is that the burden
of proof is placed upon the debtor."'i
While the Swarb court gave cognizance to the burden which cog-
novit judgments place on the debtor, the emphasis there was on the
consciousness and voluntariness of the waiver of constitutional rights:
A warrant of attorney authorizing judgment is perhaps the
most powerful and drastic document known to civil law. The
signer deprives himself of every defense and every delay of execu-
tion, he waives exemption of personal property from levy and
sale under the exemption laws, he places his cause in the hands
of a hostile defender. For that reason the law jealously insists on
proof that this helplessness and impoverishment was voluntarily
accepted and consciously assumed.52
Judgments and executions entered in accordance with the
above procedure comply with the due process of law clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment provided that there has been an
understanding and voluntary consent of the debtor in signing
the document containing the confession of judgment clause
(citations omitted).53 However, if there has not been such an
49. 332 F. Supp. at 1180.
50. 314 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd 405 U.S. 191 (1972).
51. 314 F. Supp. at 1094.
52. Id. at 1095, citing Cutler Corp. v. Latshaw, 374 Pa. 1, 5, 97 A.2d 234,
236 (1953).
53. 314 F. Supp. at 1095. See also National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent,
375 U.S. 311, 316 (1964); American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156,
168-69 (1932).
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understanding consent, the above-described Pennslyvania pro-
cedure violates the due process requirements of notice and
opportunity to be heard prior to the entry of judgment (cita-
tions omitted).sa The evidence must be examined to determine
whether understanding consent to this Pennsylvania procedure is
present in the execution of the documents containing such
clauses by members of the class on whose behalf this suit is
brought.5 (Emphasis added.)
The members of the class on whose behalf the instant suit was
brought are welfare applicants, otherwise eligible for welfare assist-
ance, who, because they are property owners, are required to give a
lien on their property as a condition for receiving the benefits. It
must then be determined if this class of persons voluntarily and
knowingly- consented to the confession of judgment and thereby
waived their constitutional rights of hearing and notice.
Due process rights to notice 7 and hearing5s prior to a civil judg-
ment are subject to waiver. However, any presumption that a person
acquiesces in the waiver of his constiutional rights has been ad-
amantly denied by the United States Supreme Court.59 On the con-
trary, the presumption against the waiver of those rights has been
well-settled.30 In deciding the federal question of waiver, the court
must look to the facts which allegedly support the waiver.61
The facts here are that plaintiffs are welfare recipients, financially
deprived and generally uneducated. The question then becomes
whether a person in that position, when signing a confession of
judgment which gives a lien on his property, does so voluntarily,
knowingly and intending to waive his constitutional rights to hearing
and notice. The voluntariness of the action is questionable:
54. 314 F. Supp. at 1095. See also Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395
U.S. 337, 339-40 (1969); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550 (1965);
Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313-15 (1950); Coe v.
Armour Fertilizer Works, 237 U.S. 413, 422-26 (1915).
55. 314 F. Supp. at 1096.
56. D. H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 185 (1972).
57. Id.; National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 315-16
(1964).
58. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378-79 (1971).
59. Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 (1966); Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public
Util. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 307 (1937).
60. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70-71 (1941).
61. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
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It is absurd to speak of the welfare agreement as formalizing a
bargain freely made. Execution of the form will generally be a
routine procedure with no give-and-take between the parties and
with an assumption on the part of the agency's administrator
that the applicant for relief will sign, whether or not he under-
stands its import, because he has no choice.62
It is likewise open to question whether the applicant places his sig-
nature on the form knowing-and intending-the consequences. The
court in Swarb, based on a published report,03 found that of all judg-
ments confessed in Pennsylvania over a period of years, 96 per cent
were against individuals with incomes of less than $10,000 per year.
Of that group, 95 per cent of those who had signed such instruments
lacked understanding of what they were signing. Plaintiffs are ob-
viously within the income bracket of those surveyed.64
In light of the above evidence, can it be said that a person in the
dass of plaintiffs waives his constitutional rights when he signs form
DPA 9 or form DPA 176-K? It would seem not. The Charleston
court's refusal to face this issue will undoubtedly have adverse effects
on the current trend toward full protection of the poor.
Janice Kromrey Corr
62. Note, Public Assistance: The Right to Receive; The Obligation to Repay,
43 N.Y.U.L. Rv. 451, 487 (1968).
63. D. CAPLOVITZ, CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE (Feb. 1968).
64. 332 F. Supp. at 1178.
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